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[This article explores and critiques Ronald Dworkin’s arguments on 
the value of integrity in law. Dworkin presents integrity in both 
legislation and adjudication as holding inherent political value. The 
author defends an alternative theory of the value of integrity, 
according to which integrity holds instrumental value as part of a legal 
framework that seeks to realise a particular set of basic values taken to 
underpin the legal system as a whole. It is argued that this 
instrumental-value theory explains the value of integrity more 
satisfactorily than Dworkin’s inherent-value account. The article 
concludes with a discussion of Dworkin’s ‘one right answer thesis’. 
Although the proposed theory of integrity does not support a strong 
version of Dworkin’s thesis, it does suggest that there will be a single 
correct answer to legal questions more often than for normative 
deliberation generally.] 
 
The writings of Ronald Dworkin have exercised enormous influence on 
contemporary legal theory.
1
 Dworkin’s account of law centres on his theory 
of adjudication. In an early article, he goes so far as to characterise the 
question, ‘what is law?’, as merely a truncated statement of the more central 
issue, ‘what, in general, is a good reason for decision by a court of law?’
2
 
One of the pivotal ideas in Dworkin’s theory of adjudication is the notion of 
integrity, which he treats as a fundamental and distinctive political value. In 
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Dworkin treats integrity in both legislation and adjudication as holding 
inherent political value; that is, he argues integrity is valuable in and of itself. 
He supports this position by appealing to our deeply held intuitions about the 
undesirability of certain legal practices that reject integrity. The main aim of 
this article is to suggest an alternative theory of the value of integrity, 
according to which integrity holds instrumental value as part of a legal 
framework that seeks to realise a particular set of basic values taken to 
underpin the legal community. I suggest that this instrumental-value account 
explains our intuitions about the value of integrity more satisfactorily than 
Dworkin’s inherent-value theory. 
 
The article has three parts. Part I introduces Dworkin’s notion of integrity and 
outlines his explanation of its political value. In Part II, I introduce my 
alternative explanation for the value of integrity and explain how it improves 
upon Dworkin’s account. Finally, Part III discusses the relationship between 
Dworkin’s notorious ‘one right answer thesis’ and my proposed theory of 
integrity. I argue that, although the notion of integrity does not support a 
strong version of the one right answer thesis, it does suggest that there will be 




I DWORKIN’S THEORY OF INTEGRITY 
 
Dworkin’s theory of law has developed significantly over time. The focus 
here is on the most comprehensive version to date, outlined in Law’s Empire. 
In that work, Dworkin famously analyses judicial decision-making as 
comprising three stages.
4
 The first is a preinterpretive stage in which the 
rules and standards that hold relevance for the case at hand are tentatively 
identified. The second is an interpretive stage where the judge formulates a 
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general theory of the motivations and rationales underlying the elements of 
practice identified in the previous stage. Finally, at the postinterpretive stage, 
the judge forms a view about what decision the prevailing social practice 
requires in the present case, taking into account the general framework of 
justification posited at the preceding step. 
  
The interpretive stage of the above process introduces an explicitly purposive 
element into legal deliberation. The use of a general theory outlining the 
principles and values underpinning the salient legal rules is arguably the core 
element of Dworkin’s theory of legal adjudication. This purposive dimension 
in Dworkin’s theory is closely related to his notion of law as integrity.  
 
Dworkin treats integrity as a distinctive political value. He initially divides 
this concept into two parallel notions, corresponding to two different types of 
legal decision making: integrity in legislation and integrity in adjudication. 
Integrity in legislation requires the legislature to make the law coherent, 
bearing in mind a set of overarching values.
5
 Integrity in adjudication 
requires judges to treat the law ‘as expressing and respecting a set of coherent 
principles’.
6
 On this view, legal deliberation contains both backward- and 





Dworkin’s main example in favour of the value of integrity in legislation 
concerns ‘checkerboard’ laws that apply an arbitrary settlement to political 
disagreements.
8
 He frames the problem as follows: 
 
Do the people of Alabama disagree about the morality of racial 
discrimination? Why should their legislation not forbid racial 
discrimination on buses but permit it in restaurants? Do the British 
divide on the morality of abortion? Why should Parliament not make 
abortion criminal for pregnant women who were born in even years but 




Dworkin argues that there is something inherently dismaying about 
checkerboard solutions to political differences. The reason for rejecting such 
solutions, however, is not immediately clear; after all, we readily accept other 
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types of political compromises. ‘Why’, Dworkin queries, ‘should we turn our 
back on checkerboard solutions as we do?’
10
 His answer is that integrity 
holds intrinsic political value. We object to checkerboard statutes simply 
because ‘a state that adopts these internal compromises is acting in an 
unprincipled way’.
11
 In accepting such compromises, ‘the state lacks integrity 
because it must endorse principles to justify part of what it has done that it 




Dworkin argues that integrity in legislation is ‘so much part of our political 
practice that no competent interpretation of that practice can ignore it.’
13
 In 
this way, his claim about the political value of legislative integrity draws on 
an explanatory theory of our existing legislative practices: we can only 
satisfactorily explain these practices and the social attitudes that surround 
them if we credit integrity with inherent value. Dworkin proceeds to integrate 
this explanatory account of integrity into a broader interpretive theory of the 
political community: the notion of integrity is consistent with a ‘community 
of principle’ – a ‘genuine associative community’ capable of sustaining a 
plausible claim to moral legitimacy – rather than a ‘rulebook community’, 




Dworkin’s argument for the value of integrity in adjudication takes a similar 
form. In the first place, it is an argument about the best explanation for 
judicial practice. For Dworkin, judicial interpretation of legal materials is 
structured by the notion of intention.
15
 The use of intention in legal 
interpretation, in turn, involves appealing to a set of general goals or 
principles in order to lend a coherent background context to particular legal 
rules.
16
 This interpretive theory of adjudication is then integrated into an 
overarching account of legal institutions as reflecting a particular notion of 
the legal community. It is at this more abstract level that the discrete 
principles of integrity in legislation and integrity in adjudication yield an 
overarching notion of law as integrity.  
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Dworkin seeks to illuminate the methodology associated with integrity in 
adjudication through his now notorious example of ‘the chain novel’.
17
 We 
are asked to imagine an enterprise in which several authors cooperate to write 
a novel. Each author interprets the chapters she or he has been given in order 
to create a new chapter, which is then added to the materials received by the 
next author. The task of each author is to contribute to making the novel ‘the 
best it can be’,
18
 which will evidently involve striving for consistency in the 
narrative.  
 
In order to achieve this goal, each author will need to ‘take up some view 
about the novel in progress, some working theory’ about its plot, theme, 
characters and so on.
19
 Arriving at such a theory will involve working out 
what possible interpretations ‘fit’ the extant chapters of the book and judging 
‘which of these eligible readings makes the work in progress best, all things 
considered.’
20
 The latter judgement may involve an aesthetic dimension, but 
will generally be guided by the ‘formal and structural considerations’ noted at 
the first stage of the process.
21
 (In legal interpretation, Dworkin later 





Dworkin describes his theory of adjudication as ‘relentlessly interpretive’, 
insofar as ‘it is both the product of and the inspiration for comprehensive 
interpretation of legal practice.’
23
 Importantly, Dworkin depicts law as 
integrity as closely tied to the contemporary context. Law as integrity ‘does 
not aim to recapture … the ideals or practical purposes of the politicians who 





There is an echo here of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s conception of interpretation 
as involving a ‘fusion of horizons’.
25
 Gadamer views understanding as 
involving a type of agreement between author and interpreter, negotiated 
through the text. Since there is ‘an inevitable difference between the 
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interpreter and the author that is created by the historical difference between 
them’, there is a sense in which ‘every age has to understand a transmitted 
text in its own way.’
26
 Textual interpretation therefore represents a dynamic 
process, in which ‘old and new continually grow together to make something 
of living value.’
27
 Dworkin’s discussion of the interpretive attitude cites with 
approval Gadamer’s view of interpretation ‘as recognising, while struggling 




It is important to note that, in arguing for integrity as a discrete and 
independent political value, Dworkin does not commit himself to holding that 
integrity has value regardless of the legal and political context. Rather, he 
appears to see it as possessing independent value within a particular type of 
political community: specifically, a community founded on an Anglo-
American common law system. The argument, as Dworkin states it, is that 
‘our political practices accept integrity as a distinct value’;
29
 that is, integrity 
‘is so much part of our political practice’ that, in interpreting that practice, it 
cannot reasonably be ignored.
30
 Nonetheless, within such a legal 
environment, Dworkin sees integrity as intrinsically valuable; we need posit 
no other conditions or values to see that it is worthwhile.  
 
 
II INTEGRITY IN THE CONTEXT OF VALUE 
 
Dworkin’s theory amounts to an inherent-value view of integrity. On this 
view, integrity is valuable in and of itself, at least within a certain type of 
legal environment. The alternative, assuming integrity has value at all, is an 
instrumental-value analysis, according to which integrity holds value as a 
way of pursuing some other, more fundamental value or values.
31
 Let us 
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therefore explore what form an instrumental-value approach to integrity 
might adopt. 
 
Suppose I am engaged by a political party to draft a policy statement. I am 
instructed that the policy document must be consistent with the platform of 
the party, which comprises a series of abstract principles. It seems clear that, 
in order to do the job well, I should do my best to ensure that my statement 
coheres in all respects with the principles in the platform; that is, I must pay 
attention to integrity. Integrity, in this situation, holds instrumental value: I 
must respect it in order to fulfil my brief of drafting a document that can be 
supported by the party platform. (We might imagine a parallel scenario where 
the party leaders brief me to produce a document that is politically expedient, 
whether or not it coheres with the broader values the party espouses; in such 
a case, integrity lacks the instrumental value it holds in the previous situation, 
whether or not it still retains some inherent value that I might autonomously 
wish to consider in approaching the task.) 
 
Does Dworkin’s argument for the value of integrity in Law’s Empire rule out 
a instrumental-value analysis like the one just outlined? Let us begin by 
reconsidering Dworkin’s discussion of checkerboard legislation. He points 
out that we are inclined to reject statutes that enact unprincipled, arbitrary 
compromises on contested political issues; his conclusion is that integrity 
holds intrinsic political value. Dworkin’s conclusion represents one possible 
explanation of our attitude to checkerboard solutions, but it is not the only 
one. We might posit that people generally view the legal system as furthering 
a particular set of moral principles (whether or not they feel confident about 
their ability to enunciate exactly what those principles are); integrity can then 
be viewed as instrumental to respecting the specific principles at which the 
legal system is thought to aim. The latter explanation resembles the case 
outlined in the previous paragraph. It is as if the legislature has been briefed 
to draft laws that cohere with a particular normative ‘platform’ (although, of 
course, no person or group has deliberately compiled the platform or 
explicitly issued the direction to value it). 
 
How are we to evaluate the two different explanations of the value of 
integrity outlined above? The matter is complicated by the particular sense in 
which Dworkin sees integrity as holding intrinsic value; as we have seen, he 
appears to restrict his claim to a particular type of legal community. 
Nevertheless, Dworkin systematically separates integrity from adherence to a 
particular moral framework. For instance, he denies that our rejection of 
checkerboard solutions merely reflects ‘our conviction that no one should 
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actively engage in producing’ a result she or he thinks unjust.
32
 His objection 
to such an explanation is that if each legislator votes for the checkerboard 
compromise in order to ‘give the maximum possible effect’ to the values she 
or he endorses, it is not clear how anyone has behaved irresponsibly.
33
 
However, the instrumental-value approach to integrity sketched above does 
not propose that integrity is instrumental to the diverse moral priorities of 
individual legal actors, but rather that it is instrumental to respecting a 
particular set of basic principles that are taken to ground the entire system of 
law. The latter view is quite capable of motivating a generalised objection to 
checkerboard statutes. 
 
Dworkin advances a further reason for thinking that the value of integrity is 
not grounded in a particular moral platform, by pointing out two different 
ways that integrity and morality may seem to conflict. He argues first that 
integrity may sometimes override moral considerations, as when decisions in 
previous cases clearly support an outcome in a current case that the judge in 
that case finds morally objectionable.
34
 In a later passage, Dworkin canvasses 
the opposite possibility: moral considerations may sometimes override 
integrity. He suggests that the requirement of integrity may not always be 
‘absolutely sovereign over what judges must do at the end of the day’, since 
‘other and more powerful aspects of political morality might outweigh this 
requirement in particular and unusual circumstances’.
35
 He elaborates that 
where integrity in adjudication leads to what a judge sees as a deeply 
immoral result, the judge will have to either enforce the unjust rule, ‘lie and 




The apparent possibility of moral reasons for action overriding integrity – or 
vice versa – arises from what Dworkin perceives as the disjunction between 
the ‘grounds’ and the ‘force’ of law. The grounds of law concern the 
circumstances in which particular propositions about law should be taken as 
true, while the force of law relates to the power any true proposition about 
law holds to justify ‘the use of collective power against individual citizens or 
groups’.
37
 Dworkin holds that any ‘full political theory of law’ will contain 
accounts of the grounds and force of law that are mutually supporting. 
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Nevertheless, the two types of analysis are separable and the factors they 




In this way, Dworkin’s analysis of integrity in adjudication attempts to 
distinguish conscientious judgements about how to act in particular 
circumstances from legal reasoning, which includes an institutional 
dimension of political morality. In a similar vein, Stanley Fish notes that 
Dworkin’s position ‘suggests that there are two types of reasons – personal 
ones and institutional ones’.
39
 It is as if the judge displaces her or his 
‘personal’ moral convictions in order to engage with law as integrity, then 
only reopens the moral status of the resulting decision under extreme 
conditions. As Dworkin puts it, the principle of integrity ‘does not 
necessarily have the last word’ in motivating action by legal agents, ‘but it 





The plausibility of Dworkin’s stance on the relationship between law as 
integrity and moral judgement depends on his depiction of the former as 
prior to the latter. For Dworkin, integrity has ‘the first word’ in legal 
deliberation; a separate moral dimension arises only when there is something 
to add. However, Dworkin’s analysis neglects what natural law theorists, 
such as John Finnis,
41
 have described as the pre-moral basis for normative 
deliberation. The notion of pre-moral value suggests that the social context 
within which normative deliberation occurs is imbued with ethical 
significance at the pre-reflective level.
42
 Dworkin treats particular ethical 
judgements as though they arise reflectively and can readily be dispensed 
with in favour of ‘institutional’ integrity. In fact, moral reasoning, as well as 
its legal counterpart, occurs within an institutional context; in this respect, as 
Fish recognises,
43
 the idea of a purely ‘personal’, non-grounded moral 
judgement is, strictly speaking, nonsense. Dworkin seems to conflate 
individual moral priorities (what Finnis calls ‘basic commitments’
44
), which 
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might loosely be described as ‘personal’, with the shared judgements of value 
on which those priorities are grounded. 
 
In order to do justice to the notion of pre-moral value, it is necessary to 
reverse the priority that law as integrity holds over ethical experience in 
Dworkin’s account. Even if one is inclined to question the universality of the 
specific basic values that theorists such as Finnis have enumerated, it seems 
indisputable that these values are widely honoured and pursued within 
Anglo-American legal communities – the type of legal environment at which 
Dworkin’s argument is directed. At this level, it is possible to regard pre-
moral judgements of value as a species of social fact;
45
 even if these basic 
judgements are not clearly universal or transcendental, they are shared, 
pervasive and, qua social phenomena, irrefutably real.  
 
I have described these shared, pre-moral judgements elsewhere as social 
judgements of ethical significance.
46
 Such judgements are firmly embedded 
in the fabric of social discourse; to this extent, they are phenomenologically 
prior to legal reasoning. Once ethical judgements are recognised as prior to 
legal judgements, however, Dworkin’s inherent-value view of integrity is 
revealed as empty, since it adds nothing to an explanatory theory of political 
discourse that the framework of pre-moral values does not already provide. 
Judgements of ethical significance provide a stable context within which 
people make reflective assessments about how to behave in morally 
significant spheres of action. It follows that, in making such assessments, 
people will wish to be consistent with the institutional requirements for 
ethical behaviour; furthermore, they will desire and expect the same 
principled attitude from others. This analysis applies to legal reasoning, 
which generally pertains to morally significant areas, as well as to other types 
of deliberation.  
 
It is notable, in this context, that we tend to place high value on integrity in 
morally significant spheres of action, in a way that distinguishes it from other 
areas of experience, such as aesthetic enjoyment. It is true that if someone 
passing through an art gallery acclaims a particular painting, then expresses 
                                                 
45
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disdain of the next item, even though it is in a similar style, one might well 
seek the reasons for her or his judgement. However, what if the person 
responds, ‘I don’t know. I just liked the last one better’? Such a response may 
be frustrating for the interlocutor, but it is not dismaying in the same way as a 
similar response to a moral question. People commonly feel that on moral 
issues there is a shared truth to be had and, furthermore, it is deficient not to 
seek it. The motivation for this belief is institutional, but it is by no means 
specifically legal. It is because law is necessarily situated within a socially 
embedded ethical framework that people object to inconsistent legal 
outcomes in morally significant spheres of action. 
 
It is worthwhile to remind ourselves at this point of the nature of Dworkin’s 
project. His account of the value of integrity rests upon an explanatory 
account of legal decision-making; this is then integrated into an overarching 
theory of the legal community. Dworkin observes – correctly, in my view – 
that a wide-ranging hermeneutic theory of our legal practices supports the 
value of integrity. However, there is an important dimension of social action 
that remains outside his theory: the dimension of pre-moral value. This leads 
to an anomalous disjunction between social judgements of moral 
significance, which Dworkin appears to conflate with personal moral 
priorities, and the institutional dimension of political morality that figures in 
legal reasoning. A comprehensive explanatory theory of legal institutions 
would seek to integrate these aspects of normative experience.  
 
Integrating the dimension of pre-moral value into Dworkin’s interpretive 
theory of law improves the explanatory power of his account, by providing an 
additional explanatory context for the value of integrity. Dworkin’s theory, in 
its current form, appeals to the notion of integrity to explain legal practices. 
However, integrity itself is afforded no real contextual explanation; it is 
simply posited as an intrinsic component of the ideal political community. 
The notion of pre-moral value, on the other hand, allows us to explain why 
integrity is valuable: it is instrumental to the ultimate social objective of 
respecting fundamental human values. This conception of the legal 
community as enabling the pursuit of basic forms of moral expression – what 
Finnis calls the ‘common good’
47
 – provides a rich explanatory framework 
for legal practices. Unlike Dworkin’s account, it avoids positing an artificial 
separation between ‘institutional’ political morality and pre-moral 
judgements of ethical significance. 
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The view of integrity outlined above has the additional merit of defusing an 
important objection to Dworkin’s theory. Larry Alexander and Ken Kress 
have argued that Dworkin’s conception of integrity requires morally incorrect 
principles to be preferred to morally correct principles where the former are 
more consistent with the extant legal materials – a result they find puzzling 
for a number of reasons.
48
 However, I have argued that the practice of 
integrity ultimately rests on a set of basic values that are common to both 
moral and legal reasoning. These fundamental precepts figure in legal 
deliberation from the preinterpretive level. It follows from this account that 
only morally correct principles will fully satisfy Dworkin’s dimension of 
‘fit’: the best theory of the existing law will always be one that is consistent 
with the pre-moral basis of the legal community.   
 
 
III IS THERE ‘ONE RIGHT ANSWER’? 
 
Dworkin’s account of legal interpretation as involving a background theory 
of ‘fit’ and ‘political morality’ has sometimes been interpreted as entailing 
that there is one correct answer to every case that comes before the judiciary. 
Stephen Guest describes this position, which he calls the ‘one right answer 
thesis’, as a doctrine that is ‘not of Dworkin’s own making, but which has 
been ascribed to him.’
49
 Dworkin has, however, sometimes advanced strong 
views on the possibility of right answers in difficult cases of legal 
interpretation. In Taking Rights Seriously, he speaks of his suggested 
methodology as potentially supporting a ‘seamless web’ of principle that 
‘provides a coherent justification for all common law precedents’.
50
 
Elsewhere, he argues that, ‘in a modern, developed and complex [legal] 
system’, the case where a ‘best’ answer is agreed not to exist would ‘be so 
rare as to be exotic’.
51
 Likewise, in the Preface to Law’s Empire, Dworkin 
proposes that ‘in most hard cases there are right answers to be hunted by 
reason and imagination’, although this does not mean that ‘in these cases one 
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Let us consider Dworkin’s stance on right answers in light of the theory of 
integrity suggested above. If the value of law as integrity is intertwined with 
the ethical basis of law, is there a ‘best’ answer to most, if not all, legal 
questions? The answer depends partly on whether, like Finnis, one views 
basic values as multiply realisable.
53
 According to the classical natural law 
outlook that Finnis endorses, there are often multiple responses to a moral 
quandary that show respect for pre-moral values, although certain reactions 
will be ruled out of court.
54
 If law as integrity derives its institutional context 
partly from pre-moral judgements of value, a similar analysis might be 
expected to apply to the legal context.  
 
The above analysis suggests that, as Finnis argues in an article on Law’s 
Empire, just as there are many different ways to go wrong in legal 
deliberation, so too are there multiple ways of getting it right.
55
 Two caveats 
are, however, appropriate. First, moral engagement within any given 
community takes place within specific discursive parameters for the 
realisation of pre-moral value. Law, in the form of statutes and precedent, 
plays a significant role in maintaining these institutional boundaries. In other 
words, although multiple institutional arrangements are consistent with 
respect for the basic values, particular legal communities will come to reflect 
defined frameworks for ethical realisation. These evolved frameworks, 
insofar as they do not conflict with basic ethical demands, may justly claim 
moral force, even though their exact form is ethically contingent. This is 
similar to the way that, according to Thomas Aquinas, positive rules may 
properly be derived from the natural law as ‘implementations of general 
directives’.
56
 Respect for pre-moral value requires a stable legal framework 
for human behaviour, but the pre-moral dimension does not itself specify the 
framework in all its detail. 
 
There is another reason why the questions upon which legal officials must 
pass judgement are sometimes properly regarded as foreclosed by moral 
considerations. Everyday moral deliberation concerns the way a person 
realises value in her or his own activities; legal deliberation, on the other 
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hand, concerns the imposition of generalised rules upon the engagement of 
individuals with the social environment. Respecting the autonomy of the 
moral subject entails avoiding unnecessary interference with her or his choice 
of substantive moral commitments, subject only to the constraints imposed 
by the basic values.
57
 It follows that legal officials should only deliberately 
interfere with individual choices to remedy or avoid an ethical wrong. In an 
ideal world, every appeal to legal officials would have an ethical basis. In 
practice, however, legal institutions tend to provoke rent seeking behaviours, 
whereby people seek preferential support for their individual moral priorities, 
although their moral rights have not been violated. Such ungrounded appeals 
to legal authority should properly go unheeded.  
 
In this way, the generalised nature of legal authority suggests that there will 
be a ‘right’ answer to legal questions more frequently than for normative 
deliberation generally. Of course, as Dworkin frequently points out,
58
 the 
view that legal cases may admit a correct answer does not entail that the 
relevant outcome can be proved right to the satisfaction of everyone. Law 
should be regarded as a form of social discourse that engages reflectively 
with the ethical context presented in everyday experience. In practice, what 
matters is that the ethical foundations of legal deliberation are taken 
seriously. The importance of ethically grounding legal decisions signifies the 
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